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Dilemmas of religious reform (Islâh)
Reinstitutionalizing sharî'a
Armando Salvatore
1 This  article  discusses  the  metamorphosis  of  Islamic  traditions  that  is  due  to  their
increasing  exposure  to  global  communication  and  legal regulation.  It  focuses,  in
particular, on the historical alteration in the understanding of sharî'a in Egypt caused by
the modernization of  state rule,  the reform of  the legal  system,  the emergence of  a
modern press and a modern public sphere, and the process of reform (islâh) of Islamic
traditions that engaged significant portions of the religious and intellectual elite.
2 The discussion first reconstructs the process of legal-judiciary deinstitutionalization and
normative reformulation of sharî'a that corresponds to the classic phase of islâh, linked to
the name and work of Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905). It then addresses the dilemmas
faced by those "late-classic" reformers or even "post"-reformers, who were confronted,
around the time of the demise of the caliphate in Instanbul (1922-24), with what they
perceived as a tabula rasa in sharî'a's institutional rooting. They, therefore, sought to fill
this  vacuum by capitalizing on the reformulation of  Islamic  norm performed by the
classic islâh in order to sketch new paths of institutionalizing sharî'a. With the exception
of the reconstitution of the caliphate, these debates and projects which date back to the
1920s,  along  with  their  dilemmas,  provide  a  historical  background  — as  well  as  a
historical memory selective drawn upon — for the so-called sahwa islâmiyya, the "Islamic
awakening" movement that flourished in Egypt during the 1970s and 1980s. Article 2 of
the new constitution of 1971 proclaimed sharî'a a main source of legislation,  and the
amendment of 1980 further enhanced sharî'a to the main such source (Salvatore, 1997).
3 The Islamic sharî'a (al-shari'a al-islâmiyya) is the religious norm that Muslims consider the
emanation  of  God's  will  (shar),  as  revealed  in  the  Koran.  The  grade,  intensity,  and
extension  of  sharî'a's  normative  power  vary  considerably  both  historically  and
geographically. The construction of sharî'a as a conceptual tool defining an entity-like
normative system however, has been gradual. It is not built into any particular legal-
cultural  repertoire residing either  in scripture or  in the historical  experience of  the
protocommunity (the umma) of Muhammad, his companions, and the first rightly-guided
Dilemmas of religious reform (Islâh)
Égypte/Monde arabe, 34 | 1998
1
caliphs.  "The  sharî'a  is  a  concept  with  which  Islamic  thinkers  in  the  formative  and
classical periods were not concerned" (Smith, 1965:585).
4 The present investigation seeks to evaluate the impact of global communication, within
modem public spheres, on the metamorphosis of this particular moral-legal dimension of
Islamic  traditions.  This  process  of  alteration  caused  by  global  constraints  cannot  be
simply reduced to linear pressure on sharî'a to become a mere tool to affirm a particular
identity, or to assert the belonging to an autonomous legal tradition (a claim of "legal
identity").  The  analysis  will  describe  how  the  enduring  — though  rapidly
metamorphosing — transcendence-bound, specifically religious rationale of sharî'a has,
within  the  broader  current  of  islâh,  been  the  object  of  interpretative  contest  and
competing projects of reinstitutionalization of divine norm within a modern legal and
political landscape.
5 Globalization, in this context, does not so much imply the constraints of state-building
and state-centralization projects pursued by Muhammad 'Ali and his successors in Egypt
in the wake of the increasing market and financial interdependence of Egypt with Europe
during the 19th century, which required the efficient mobilization of the working force
and the enactment of measures to secure national control over the whole process (for a
pioneering work on this "political economy" dimension of globalization, see Gran, 1979).
Globalization,  here,  refers  to  the  requirements  of  legal  regulation  and  intellectual
communication in the public sphere that followed the centralization of state authority, in
the context of increasing colonial influence, and that led to the concomitant reform of
the legal and judicial system and to the rise of a modern press. In both cases, and as a
common rationale, this process can be defined as the rise of autonomous professionals of
law and of intellectual communication who were faithful to the new national project, but
did not become mere instruments of the ruler's policy priorities which, in any case, was
severely restricted by British colonial presence.
6 This presence represented the most recent chapter of century-long European influence in
Egypt,  where the French,  after  Napoleon's  military occupation (1798-1801),  had been
prominent in lending a legitimacy to modern canons and disciplines of law, education
and discourse rationality, by acting as advisers and planners in several branches of the
administration (cf.  Alleaume,  1989 and Goldberg,  1997).  This  influence,  however,  was
hardly one-sided as Egyptian cultural elites did not partake passively in the new public
and intellectual game linking Egypt to Europe during the 19th century. Much attention
has been devoted to the case of shaykh Rifâ'a al-Tahtâwî (1801-1873),  graduate of the
Islamic university al-Azhar, who had a formative influence on the Egyptian public sphere,
even  prior  to  the  rise  of  autonomous  press  organs  that  no  longer  fulfilled  merely
administrative channels of communication, between the 1860s and 1880s. In his contacts
and exchanges with French society and culture and, in particular, in his encounter with
French intellectual and legal rationalities, al-Tahtâwî gained the intellectual power and
legitimacy needed to implement reforms with greater expertise. He believed that he was
reshaping a renaissance of Islamic knowledge and social power. He translated the French
civil code into Arabic, seeing it as a valuable tool of civilization and state power.
7 When speaking of globalization — such as the globalization of normative frameworks — a
more compelling force is evoked than that at work in the culturally rich and politically
tense environment within which al-Tahtâwî developed his intercultural competencies in
shaping  a  proto-national  project  of  social  reform.  The  process  of  restructuring  the
understanding and public influence of shari'a, which occupied the agenda of islâh from
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about the time al-Tahtâwî died onward, is a good case of how globalizing influences work
unpredictably in national contexts, enhance social complexity, and multiply the fields
where rationalities of law claim to regulate social transactions. Globalization, in this case,
is a catalyst of complexity. The autochthonous ruler, the older and newer intellectual
elites, and the colonial power largely lost control of the monitoring of social reform and
transformation. This complexity is the result of the formation of rationalities specific to
subsystems of  social  action and communication and is  indifferent  to  rules  of  reason
claimed as  valid for  all  society.  At  stake here is  the development of  an increasingly
unbridgeable  tension  between  the  reform  of  the  legal  system  and  the  visions  and
ambitions to reform the moral norms of society. The metamorphosis of sharî’a isto a large
extent located in this field of tension and driven by attempts to bridge the gap. This
tension is  neither specific  to the modernization of Muslim societies nor to colonized
societies, in general. It is also inherent in the modernization of normative frameworks
and legal institutions elsewhere.
8 Some historical evidence suggests that, in the time prior to the modem state-building of
the 19th century, the legal function of at least those religious specialists ('ulamâ’)engaged
as  judges,  qâdî-s  (differently  from  the  muftis,  who  are  dispensers  of  advisory  legal
opinions)  became  well  differentiated  from  the  general  function  of  knowledge  and
guidance demanded of 'ulamâ' (Johansen, 1988 and 1993). Modern state-building, before
the rise of a public sphere, completed this differentiation by increasingly stripping the
formulation-interpretation  of  law from the  formally  independent,  religiously  trained
jurists, and making it a competence of state authorities. In the process of transition, the
juridical  personnel  and  institutions  nurturing  this  religious  law  lost  their  legal
competencies at the advantage of new courts set up by the state, but were not disrupted.
These religious specialists were forced to engage in a process of revision of their social
role:  sometimes unwillingly,  under the pressure of  a state desirous to restrain them,
sometimes more actively, through the stimuli of contests in the newly created public
spheres, and sometimes by an impulse of reform developed by some 'ulamâ' under the
double incentive of state-building and of debates in the public sphere over issues of social
welfare and of common good. A new normative view of consensus within the community
(the umma) emerged in the process.
9 Different  from the idea  of  Arab-Islamic  "renaissance"  (nahda),  based on civilizational
rebirth, as protagonists and observers of the reform process liked to describe it, the islâh 
comes  close  to  expressing  a  reflexive  concern  with  subjective  becoming  in  history.
Though it has some rooting in the Koran, the first conscious self-identification of some
thinkers as committed to the islâh is  contemporary to,  and complementary with,  the
process of reification of Islam that has taken place in public discourse since the end of the
nineteenth  century  in  the  Egyptian  public  sphere.  At  that  time,  in  titles  of  books
published in Arabic,  Islam as the more "systematized and externalized" term for the
Koranic din, outnumbered the "personalist and activist" term imam by a ratio of over 13
to  1.  Since  that  time,  îmân  has  virtually  disappeared  from  the  headlines  of  public
discourse, which has been solidly hegemonized by Islam (Smith, 1962:114-17).
10 Islâh represents a blueprint for reconstructing an original tradition in Islamic terms, by
building on it modem claims of a collective identity. The propagators of islâh liked to feel
they  were  in  line  with  the  chain  of  cyclical  reformers  initiated  by  Muhammad and
anticipated by him in a famous hadîth. The feeling of intellectual distinction is conveyed
in conviction that reformers of Islam since Muhammad have always been "alone (ghurabâ)
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in the world" (Merad, 1978:141-42). In this sense, the reform as "concentrated on the need
to improve, correct, reorganize, renovate and restore" (Merad, 1978: 144) embodies a will
to  legislate  over  a  reluctantcommunity  by  restoring  the  allegedly  pristine  model  of
discipline  of  the  subject  and  regulation  of  intersubjective  relations.  This  is  no
contradiction, since the word islâh signifies "performing the good" in the assumption that
the good is  known,  as  incorporated in the idealized Islamic community.  In the final
analysis,  the  legitimacy  of  islâh  is  that  it  reflects  the  fulfillment  of  the  canonical
injunction of "commanding good and prohibiting evil," on which the muslihûn based their
idea of what the regulating authority of the faithful should be (Merad, 1978:141). The
actual content of "reform," however, depends on working out the societal needs of the
time, as reflected in the enhancement of maslaha 'âmma or simply maslaha (the general
interest or public good) as a main source of lawfulness. Translating islâh as "reform" is
therefore reductive. The major scope of islâh was a new definition of the Muslim subject
and his moral endowments, making his conscience the hub of virtuous action which is
finalized by helping other members of the community correct their errors and vices. This
was no political program. 'Abduh had a disparaging view of politics (siyâsa), in spite of his
judiciary responsibilities and his attempt to attain wide public support for his teachings.
State institutions were important tools to carry out the disciplining and civilizing project
of  islâh,  but  were  not  the  ultimate  scenario  of  social,  morally  guided,  action  and
communication.
11 As a result, despite the fact that Muhammad's community functioned as a model, islâh
’snovelty is that it replaced an arbitrarily sacralized Consensus of the community (ijmâ) 
with another kind of consensus, based on the immanent rules of public communication,
that placed a bonus on the public use of reason for discussing issues on society's common
interest. In this context, the goal of Islamic reformism is the final deconstruction of ijmâ' 
andthe revitalization of ijtihâd ("free reasoning" in the determination of binding truth) as
an instrument for working out solutions beneficial to the life of the umma and its welfare.
This was no mere theoretical stance, since the practice itself of reformers was to perform
ijtihâd in such a way as to best capitalize on its public impact. The most famous work by
Muhammad 'Abduh, Risâlatal-tawhîd (1897), is prominent not so much for the degree of
doctrinal innovation, but for the way in which it publicly conveys a highly compact and
easily readable message of reform in a virtually journalistic style (Merad, 1978:159).
12 In its discussion of islah, Western literature highlighted how its calling for an adaptation
of the legal-moral competencies of 'ulamâ' and of all Muslim citizens to the requirements
of a modern society finally resulted in defining sharî'a "in terms of its empty spaces"
(Kerr, 1966:210). This interpretation comes close to revealing the internal inconsistency
of any attempt at reform within Islamic traditions or even their basic non-reformability.
It  is  also  possible  to  reinterpret the  reform  blueprint  as  aiming  to  formulate  the
vocabulary and the rules, the meta-language and the "metanorm,"of the public sphere
that was shaped in Egypt between the 1860s and 1880s, in the context of the expanding
scope  of  the  press  from  merely  the  mouthpiece  of  political  authority  — intent  in
rationalizing communication down the echelon of an even more complex bureaucracy —
to a forum of expression for the political and cultural aspirations of an intellectual class
in  upheaval.  In  the  case  of  religious  reformers  (the  muslihûn),  this  transformation
encouraged them to conceive their islâh as a reconstruction of divine norm by focusing on
the  subject  and  its  disciplining  and  by  assembling  different  strands  of  canonical
observance and obligations around a much stronger notion of the Muslim as individual,
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believer  and  citizen  (al-Kûmî,  1992).  Reformers  thereby  redesigned  the  normative
consensus in the public sphere, by assuming they were purifying a religious tradition
corrupted  by  undue  innovations  and  by  sharing  the  definition  of  the  actual  public
agendas of the emerging nation-state politics.
13 In a certain sense, the shari'a, as evoked today in both its morally "personalizable," and
legally  "systematizable"  dimensions,  was  born  out  of  these  transformations.  Crucial,
among them, was the gradual deinstitutionalization — more than abandonment (Brown,
1997) — of the religious law administered by 'ulamâ' trained as jurists (fuqahâ) within al-
mahakim al-shar'iyya, the "religious courts", or more precisely the "tribunals of the divine
norm" (the shar). The major rupture in the competencies of these courts, before their
suppression and incorporation of their residual functions on matters of personal status
into the state system in 1956, was the institution in Egypt,  in 1883, of al-mahakim al-
ahliyya, the "national", or "indigenous" courts. In retrospect, since their suppression, al-
mahakim al-shar'iyya have been called "sharî'a tribunals" by Western analysts and actors.
This appears 'to be an inverted anachronism, since this view of shari'a, a pretended shari'a 
regulating subject  and system,  was much the product of  the process  that  led to the
disempowerment  of  these  courts.  But,  this  normalization  process  of  the  past  and
construction of a normative tradition is not particular to sharî'a. Any normative order
fiercely negates that it was born at a certain moment in history through an arbitrary
normative volition, through power games, via the selection of commandments and their
inscription into tables, through social differentiation. Law must never "begin" (Luhmann,
1995:138).
14 In this process lies the formation of a "new" normative discourse on sharî'a that bridges
the gap between the traditionally revered divine norm, revived and given a new meaning
in the face of modernization and the law, intended as positive, "secular" and issued by a
sovereign state.  This  law is  respected and feared as  powerful  and necessary,  though
viewed as a tool to regulate social behavior and discipline social subjects, a view that
religious reformers largely shared with stateauthorities. "Secular" intellectuals regarded
divine norm and secular law in another light. They were more immediately fascinated
and gratified by the new autonomous lawfulness of a growing state sustained by a vital
nation (a process made more complex and dramatic in Egypt by the British military
occupation of 1882, that was followed by the imposition of different degrees of control on
several  branches  of  the  state  machinery).  These  intellectuals  — most  of  whom were
prominent legal professionals who graduated in state law schools — sought nonetheless a
dialogue with religious authorities. By revering the divine norm in their own way, they
became  entangled  in  the  same  kind  of  puzzle  faced  by  religious  reformers:  how to
redefine  the  relationship  between  an  abstract  lawfulness  derived  from  God's
commandments, which could not be deprived of its divine legitimacy and transcendent
reference by a simple fiat of a state authority, and institutional legality.
15 This  differentiation,  tension,  and  will  to  harmonization,  which  involved  abstract
normativity and a legal system, lawfulness and law, did not result, during the classic era
of islâh, in loud claims to recuperate the legal efficacy of sharî'a and implement its newly
assembled normativity  within  the  system of  positive law.  In  the  period immediately
preceding  the  institution  of  the  national  courts,  the  Egyptian  Minister  of  Justice,
Muhammad Qadrî, had worked extensively on a project of codification of sharî'a, but with
the exception of laws of personal status, for which the religious courts were allowed to
keep their competencies, the national courts adopted Trench-style" codes, designed to
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suit a "French-style" system of tribunals. However, aside from the form and structure of
codes  and  courts,  which  best  suited  the  imperatives  of  order  and  control  of  a  fast
centralizing  state  (even  more  so  since,  at  the  time,  it  faced  a  traumatic  colonial
penetration that never reduced it to a "colony"), many elements of islamic law, in its new
codified form, were integrated into the codes.
16 The decision to downplay the influence of a newly conceived and codified sharî'a on the
codes was more pragmatic than strategic. It sought to provide the new courts with a law
already experimented in the mixed courts,  introduced in 1876 to handle cases where
interests of a European power were at stake (so as to overcome consular jurisdiction in
cases involving Egyptian citizens). Its aim was to avoid giving the military occupant a
pretext for discrediting or manipulating this important tool of state modernization and
national independence. It also sought to gain European acceptance to suppress the mixed
courts, themselves considered an unacceptable vestige of foreign influence (Brown, 1995:
115-118). The move was probably not intended by any major Egyptian actor as a rebuttal
of sharî'a, but as a convenient step in keeping its influence discrete and invisible, in a
period when the task of transforming the corpus of legal regulations, recorded in texts of
fiqh of different schools, into standardized, unified codes was still in its early stage. This
absence of public zeal in upholding the visibility of sharî'a in the new codes may point, not
to its dismissal, but to a blend of contingent political wisdom and technical immaturity.
In time, the jurisprudence of the national courts even enhanced the sharî'a'stenor of the
applied "French law".
17 Jurisprudence, however, does not make headlines, and the perception of the fate of sharî'a
changed  swiftly  and  dramatically  in  the  socio-political  climate  of  the  1920s.  The
suppression of the caliphate in Istanbul was an important emotional component of the
change in  the  political-intellectual  climate.  A  more  immediate  factor,  however,  gave
momentum  to  the  reconstruction,  reinstitutionalization  and  enforcement  of  sharî'a. 
Amidst increasingly successful national agitation, after the revolution of 1919, and formal
independence in 1922, which diminished British influence and control, the link between
normative contests in the public arena and the implementation of a constitutional and
legislative policy became more important than ever in modern Egyptian history. Bridging
the gap between norm and law became imperative for those interested in upholding
sharî'a'slegal and institutional appeal and effectiveness in the modem world, beyond the
seemingly untouchable kernel of personal status law.
18 It  was,  in  particular,  during the 1920s  that  Muhammad Rashîd Rida (1865-1935),  the
radical disciple of Muhammad 'Abduh, consciously constructed Islam as a principle of
societal  and  political  cohesion.  This,  however,  was  clearly  to  be  anchored  in  the
conscience  and  action  of  the  individual  Muslim,  called  to  manifest  the  capacity  to
harmonize  spiritual  motivation  and  social  engagement  (Rida,  1988  [1922]:  74).  Rida
claimed,  accordingly,  that  the  efforts  towards  islâh  had  to  focus  on  the  conscious
formulation of a solution to the problem of the imâma, i.e. of the leadership within the
umma,  by constituting the latter  as  jamâ'a.  Jamâ'a  is  a  sort  of  willed community and
sovereign society that  functions on the basis  of  a  new consensus worked out by the
'ulamâ'according  to  principles  of  justice  and  equality  among  all  believer-citizens,
principles  that  Rida  considered  essential  to  the  islâh  and  to  the  injunction  of
"commanding good and prohibiting evil" (al-amr bi-1-ma'rûf wa-l-nahi 'an al-munkar). He
was very explicit in asserting that there cannot be any nahda except through Islam and, in
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particular, through the Arab people that constitutes Islam's source of origin (Rida, 1988
[1922]: 74-77; on Rida and politics, cf. Dupret, 1995).
19 The caliphate is reinterpreted as the supreme instance of legitimacy of the project of islâh
within  the  Islamic  community.  This  centrality  is  nonetheless  conceived  as  perfectly
compatible with the reality of  the nation-state.  The result  is  a Utopian vision of  the
political  import  of  public  communication  as  governed by  Arab-speaking  scholars
exercising ijtihâd. It fits the political structures and technologies of domination of the
existing states, and envisions the institutionalization of Islam as dîn siyâda wa-sultân, i.e.
as religion of sovereignty and domination (Rida, 1988 [1922]: 93-94). It is formed within
the Islamic public sphere, of consolidating Muslim-Arab nation-states, and provides the
terrain of legitimacy and self-representation of reforming 'ulamâ',  who irradiate their
legislating authority directly upon the consciences of Muslims within the jamâ'a, and
thereby elevate each of them to a free, self-conscious mujtahid (practitioner of ijtihâd) of
God's will (shar’) (Rida, 1988 [1922]: 115-16).
20 In  this  view,  any  Muslim-citizen  is  entitled  to  withdraw his  obedience  to  the  imam
whenever the latter misinterprets the shar' (Rida, 1988 [1922]: 133-34). The guarantee of
this duty-right, which is essential to the functioning of the caliphate, is seen in a modern
constitutional framework (Rida, 1988 [1922]: 148). The Utopian neo-hanbalite vision of
the  fulfillment  of  the  truth  on  earth,  by  keeping  alive  the  Prophet’s  charismatic
leadership,  is  fertilized  through a  constitutional  approach  that  takes  account  of  the
reality  of  the nation-states.  It  also,  however,  attempts  to  transcend it  by invoking a
supreme  instance  whose  purpose  it  is  to  reconstitute  a  principled  community  that
incarnates the perfecting and universalizing impulse of Islam. This vision operates along
an axis that anchors the subject within the system by emphasizing the primacy of public
and inclusivist ethics, a task that existing states are considered unable to perform, as they
are inevitably bound to an exclusivist 'asabiyya (particularistic force of cohesion).
21 With Rida, the shift in the doctrinal and practical understanding of ijtihâd, the faculty of
finding innovative legal solutions through free reasoning that Islamic jurisprudence had
confined  to  very  special  cases,  and  only  accorded  to  particularly  talented  spirits,  is
complete. In historical terms, the "gate of ijtihâd"was never closed, but rather restricted
to cases that were not crucial to the actual functioning of the legal system — as it evolved
and was consolidated — thereby reducing the margins of individual arbitrariness (Hallaq,
1984).  Through  a  concerted  adaptation  of  the  system  to  evolving  circumstances,
innovation was permissible,  but  only by invoking the ijmâ',  i.e.  the consensus of  the
jurists. In the era of the public sphere, a new emphasis on ijtihâd emerged along with a
previously  unknown,  emphatically  constructed  opposition  to  taqlîd,  along  with  a
distancing from the ijmâ'. Both were often perceived as fostering the unwillingness of the
'ulamâ' to take up the challenges of the modern world. If evaluated from the viewpoint of
the legal system's pace of reform, this position was out of touch with reality. By the time
the  legal  system,  based  on  traditional  divine  law  and  its  literature  and  practice  of
jurisprudence  (fiqh),  was  called  to  cope  with  these  challenges,  it  was  being  swiftly
deprived of  its  institutional  competencies,  without  significant  objections  by  religious
reformers (Brown, 1997). At this stage, however, ijtihâd was propagated, quite consciously,
not as a technical-juridical skill of excellence, or a device for updating the legal system,
but  as  a  method to  regulate  and encourage participation in  discussions  on issues  of
common interest, to foster a moral and discursive discipline to addressing such questions,
and to establish a new view of lawfulness and a new consensus of communication in the
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public sphere and in society at large. Ijtihâd wasexpanded from a classic method, which
dilated the normative import of scripture via independent reasoning, into a discipline of
rational-critical debate in the public sphere. Its practice would best capitalize on public
impact and establish the legislating authority of reason only bound to the Koran.
22 The myth of the closing of the gate of ijtihâd, and the call to reopen it, might have been
created by those religious reformers eager to turn consensus, from an exceptional and
exclusive mechanism of infra-scholarly accommodation, into a permanent and inclusive
mechanism  of  scrutiny  establishing  sound  arguments  based  on  the  judgment  of  an
impersonal, potentially ubiquitous "public." The period between the 1880s and the 1920s
saw  an  "essentialist"  implosion  of  sharî'a  from  its  previous  positive,  systemic  and
institutional  efficacy,  to  its  pretended  authentic,  normative  kernel.  This  kernel  was
reformulated not merely under the pressure of a syndrome of identity-construction or an
obsession with authenticity,  but  according to the new rules  of  the public  sphere,  its
metanorm and the "new" consensus.
23 The  project  of  islâh  played  on  a  triple  register,  which  is  typical  of  any  historical
constitution or major transformation of a public sphere. Law, as a particular form of
regulation  of  human  behavior  and  social  transactions,  was  instrumentally  called  to
provide the intermediate term bridging the gulf, through the disciplining mechanisms
specific  to  legal  enforcement,  between  two  other  elements  otherwise  difficult  to
compound in practice: the construction of models of personal virtue, and the approach of
a metanorm expected to allow rational communication within the community. The useful
fiction of metanorm consists in providing the public sphere and its actors with a unitary
vocabulary — a  homogeneous  normative  staging  ground (Salvatore,  1998).  A  problem
arises when the invocation of law becomes an overly ancillary fiction in the game, and
slides away from the control of public sphere heroes, old and new intellectuals.
24 A book from the same period, by the Egyptian 'âlim 'Alî 'Abd al-Râziq (1888-1966), al-islâm
wa-usûl  al-hukm  (Islam  and  the  Fundaments  of  Rule,  1925),  mainly  assessed  as
championing  a  "liberal"  and  "secularist"  approach  to  Islam,  should  be  placed  in  its
historical context, within the trajectory of islâh and its dilemmas on how to bridge the
gap between norm and law,  between authority  and institution.  'Abd al-Râziq's  essay
represents the culmination of the reforming endeavor that reached, with. Rida, a point of
no return. In spite of the basic admission of the contingent character of power in the
Islamic community, politics in its modern shape was claimed to be resubjected to faith.
This was much of a weakness and theoretical impasse,which also trapped those analysts
engaged in making sense of the "Islamic revival," and who ended up reducing it to "faith-
driven politics."
25 'Abd al-Râziq instead performed a radical de-conflation of faith and politics in a way that
was still consistent with the original Utopian view of islâh. Dissociating politics from faith
was seen as the only way to revive the credibility and authority of God's will, and sharî'a 
itself.  First,  'Abd al-Râziq agreed with the general inclination of islâh not to radically
challenge the Consensus of the community (ijmâ) on a doctrinal level, in spite of tension
with the reinvigoration of ijtihâd ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925:22). His goal was rather to render its
applicability  questionable  over  the  issue  around  which  the  stake  of  consensus  was
politically the highest: the invocation of ijmâ' for establishing that Islam prescribes the
organization  of  political  authority  as  a  religious  obligation.  He  did  not  hesitate  to
denounce  the  hypocrisy  of  the  juridical  argument  that,  suppressing  any  effort  to
rationally  analyze  the  fundaments  of  political  power,  constructs  the  fiction  of  the
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investiture of the caliph (bay'a) as legitimated by the Consensus. Historical reality shows
that with rare exceptions, the caliphate was founded on the basis of brutal force ('Abd al-
Râziq,  1925:23  and  31).  Following  this  argumentative  logic,  'Abd  al-Râziq
straightforwardly  made  tabula  rasa  of  those  arguments  that  obstructed  a  critical
consideration of the reality of power and of its relation to Islam as din. He performed this
task with a deconstructionist vehemence completely absent in Ridâ's argument, in spite
of the latter's similarly innovative approach to the Consensus.
26 On the other hand, 'Abd al-Râziq was very eager to stress that the Koranic din is a religion
not limited to teaching the principles  of  fraternity and equality,  but  also to actively
educate its followers to practice these precepts and, above all, to forge norms inspired by
them ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925:27). Here, he clearly establishes that Islam constitutes, besides
din, and as a consequence of its special character as din, a principle of civic life, thereby
affecting  the  dunya,  the  worldly  environment  with  its  social  obligations.  Islam  is  a
madhhab (path, teaching, but also movement) of islâh for all mankind ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925:
76).  The  Islamic  community  is  still  considered  as  given  by,  and  bound  to,  kullu  ma
shara'ahu  al-islam ("all  that  Islam prescribes"),  from which  only  al-hukm al-siyâsî,  the
vertical dimension of organization of the community, is excluded ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925:84).
27 An essential  point of  this argument is  that since Islam is this special  sort of  socially
expanded din, grounded on values of equality and fraternity, Islam cannot grant to any
established power the necessary legitimacy. As a result, Islam is din la dawla, religion but
not state ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925: 64). In this way, 'Abd al-Râziq symmetrically countered the
slogan of Islam din wa dawla, which began to be very popular at the time of the demise of
the caliphate. Seeing beyond this slogan appearedto be crucial in order to eradicate the
ambiguities of islâh towards the problem of the religious legitimization of power, and to
consolidate  the  process  of  modernizing  the  basis  of  the  consensus,  by  making  it
dependent on communication and the strength of public argument.  According to the
same logic, 'Abd al-Râziq provocatively argued that if the fuqaha' (Islamic jurists) mean by
caliphate  or  imamate  nothing  more  than  what  the  political  scientists  mean  by
"government," they were completely right to claim that the welfare of  the governed
people depended on such an institution. In this case,  however,  they were stating the
obvious.  Any addition to this  simple truth,  leading towards the establishment of  the
imamate  as  a  special,  since  religiously  grounded,  sort  of  government, would  be
unjustified ('Abd al-Râziq, 1925:45).
28 Ridâ's argument was similar to that of 'Abd al-Râziq before reaching the point where it
was forced to justify the caliphate. It follows the claim that, though authority belongs
only to God and His Prophet, the sharî'a cannot be implemented without a supervising
authority  that  institutionalizes  and  keeps  alive  — thereby  remaining  faithful  to  the
tradition of islâh — the charismatic gift of prophecy given to mujtahid-s of any epoch. As
the supreme imam, the caliph would not simply be a replica of temporal power, but the
highest 'âlim practicing ijtihâd and exerting influence,  in this indirect,  moral  way,  on
existing governments of Islamic countries (Hourani, 1983 [1962]:  240).  Rida's ultimate
point was not even on the political influence of such authority on the individual and
social  lives  of  Muslims,  but  on  the  necessity  of  making  publicly  visible  and
constitutionally accountable an institutional representation of shari'sis centrality as the
manifestation of God's Will. In this sense, Rida was unable to issue a realistic project of
reinstitutionalization of  sharî'a  in the constitutional  and legal  landscape of  the rising
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Egyptian  nation-state.  He  remained  trapped  in  the  metanormative,  moral,  and
disciplining framework of classic islâh.
29 Was Ridâ's view a mere accident of intellectual history contingent on discussions about
the reconstruction of the caliphate of that particular historical juncture, to be forgotten
forever, an ultimate token of the impossibility of a modern Islamic public sphere to find
adequate channels of institutionalization in the political and legal systems of the time?
His reconstruction of the institutional basis of sharî'a'slawfulness was neither an attempt
to resurrect older forms of institutional and legal mediations, nor realistic enough to
interfere with the constitutional process and the process of reform of codes. On the other
hand, 'Abd al-Râziq's deconstructionist vehemence aroused outrage and scandal during
the 1920s. His work was very much a sign of the time, a brutal self-diagnosis of islâh, but
its contingent misfortune was due to the fact that it offered no practical answer to the
question of how to reinstitutionalize shari'a.  However, a much more specifically legal-
technical work of reconstruction of shari'a through selection and codification of concrete
rules  and  prescriptions  of  Islamic  jurisprudence  (that  had  scored  a  first  major
achievement during the classic period of islâh in the work of Muhammad Qadrî, however
compelled to recede quickly behind the form of "French law" when it was decided about
the codes to be adopted by the National Courts), was revived with more success in the
same climate of the 1920s, affected by the ferment surrounding the issue of the caliphate.
This was a project intellectually affiliated to the islâh, trying to approach the corpus of
fiqh through the new (meta)normative conception of shari'a propagated by the reformers.
30 'Abd al-Razzâq Ahmad al-Sanhûrî, later to become the architect of the new Egyptian civil
code (promulgated in 1948) was a Sorbonne law school graduate. He was little influenced
by the metanormative obsessions of classic islâh with ijtihâd, and more straightforwardly
targeting legal and institutional reconstruction. However, his platform of departure was a
vision very close to the one campaigned by Rida. This view was included in his second
Ph.D.  thesis  in  comparative  law  from the  University  of  Lyon,  published  in  1926.  In
pleading the reinstitution of caliphal authority, Enid Hill credits his engagement in this
thesis  with  "youthful  effort"  and  "a  certain  idealism,"  but  also  recognizes  that  his
perspective on Islamic law and institutions was to orient his work for the rest of his life
(Hill, 1987: 26). The view of caliphal authority as grounded on knowledge and the faculty
of ijtihâd-s perfectly coherent with Ridâ's islâhî blueprint. The difference was in the clear
awareness  that,  for  any  such  Islamic  authority  and  lawfulness  to  function, a
modernization of  shari'a  achieved through a  legal-scientific  approach to  the texts  of
classic and contemporary jurisprudence, was imperative.
31 Codification through the adoption of the comparative method was al-Sanhûrî's view and
method, for which shari'a stood as one of the three major traditions of legal thought and
practice along with Roman and Anglo-Saxon law. In this, he turned the islâh’s concern for
working out principles of lawfulness for the whole community into a project elaborating
categories  of  law specific  to  the  heritage  of  shari'a,  though manuals  and  even  early
attempts at codification, from the end of the 19th century (like Qadrî's),  included no
explicit formulations of such categories. The comparative approach was essential to this
task. His long preparative work of civil codes, which were later adopted in Egypt, Iraq and
Syria, aimed to establish a general codification, that went beyond sharî'a. In the 1930s and
1940s,  there was an acute need for  more complete codes to fill  the existing gaps in
legislation, that even the modern jurisprudence of National Courts, largely inspired by
sharî'a, had been unable to remedy.
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32 Al-Sanhûrî's approach was neither merely theoretically metanormative,  nor adaptive-
pragmatic.  The  main  issue  was  the  prescriptive  efficacy  of  sharî'a,accomplished  by
establishing  obligations  and  rights  conform with  the  norms  therein.  They  would  be
implemented, via largely a well-functioning, reformed and rationalized legal system. This
was nothing new. It was, in fact, an unquestioned commitment of islâh, as manifested by
the  efforts  of  Muhammad  'Abduh.  But  as  soon  as  sharî'a  was  reified  in  a  concept
embodying  a  normative-systemic  rationality  in  principle,  independent  from  the
traditional corpus of scholarly texts of fiqh, the islâh saw sharî'a'saspirations to metanorm
blocked by an irresolvable dilemma. What was to be gained from essentializing normative
reason solely  on the basis  of  scripture,  while  being confronted with the progressive
marginalization of legal texts and institutions that appeared too inflexible to catch up
with modern standards? Colonial pressure was demanding a law whose outer form could
be promptly recognized as fitting the requirements of a modern legal system. As the one
major intellectual factor in the first constitution of a modern public sphere built on the
rationale of public virtue implemented for the common good, the islâh had developed a
highly principled, largely new, but very abstract vision of lawfulness and sharî'a. However,
by the time national agitation against colonial influence became successful in the 1920s,
the need for a better functioning legal system became more acute. At the same time, the
necessity to accommodate colonial preferences to keep sharî'a's influence on the legal
system as invisible as possible was attenuated. It is, however, important to point out that
the culmination of islâh is"idealism" (in fact of its metanormative utopianism, like in the
view of a new caliphate as the supreme instance of ijtihâd as "free reasoning") with Rida
was  the  necessary  departure  point.  Al-Sanhûrî,  on  the  other  hand,  provided  a
programmatic,  comparative,  and scientific  effort  at selection and functionalization of
Islamic jurisprudence for the reconstruction and reinstitutionalization, of sharî'a.  This
reinstitutionalization was completely bound to fit the requirements of the nation-state,
and did not allow for any transnational embodiment of shar'i authority. The beginnings of
a  solution  to  the  dilemma  of  how  to  reinstitutionalize  sharî'a  coincided  with  the
dissolution of islâh's original, uncompromised meta-normative ambitions.
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